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1 Introduction
The nature of central-local relationships in M-form (multi-divisional form) pub-
lic sector structures typically plays a crucial role in determining the observed
degree of tax and public expenditure decentralization and the actual extent of
local fiscal autonomy (Maskin et al. [28]). As documented in Joumard and
Kongsrud [23] and Sutherland et al. [41], national governments around the
globe exercise their command by imposing lower and/or upper bounds on lo-
cal tax rates or by mandating types and levels of expenditures on local public
services.
While the issue of central mandating and capping on local fiscal decisions
has attracted considerable interest in the theoretical and empirical public eco-
nomics literature,1 little attention has been devoted to their implications on the
empirical modelling of spatial dependence in local fiscal policies.
In fact, it has long been recognised that a key feature of decentralised fiscal
policy-making is the interdependence among decision-makers due to a variety
of spatial transmission mechanisms, with tax competition and yardstick com-
petition motives having somewhat obscured the traditional benefit spill-over
hypotheses in recent years (Brueckner [8], Allers and Elhorst [1], Revelli [36]).
However, all of the existing empirical analyses of inter-jurisdictional competition
rest on the often implausible assumption that local decision-makers are actually
free to choose their preferred policy.2 In most instances, this is not the case due
to the existence of central government mandates or caps either on taxes or on
public expenditures. The examples around the world are countless.3
This paper attempts at exploring for the first time the consequences of cen-
tral capping on the modelling and estimation of a local fiscal policy reaction
1A theoretical formalisation of the genesis of central mandates is Cremer and Palfrey [11],
while most of the empirical literature concerns tax and expenditure limitations in the US
states (Nechyba [30]; Figlio [16], Downes et al. [12], Dye et al. [14]). Boadway [7] reviews and
highlights the key issues in that regard.
2 In an early study of property tax competition within the Boston metropolitan area,
Brueckner and Saavedra [9] highlighted the link between local tax limitations and the in-
tensity of tax competition. They pointed out that “reaction functions become flat once they
encounter the levy-limit constraint" (Brueckner and Saavedra [9], p. 220) and acknowledged
the diﬃculty of modelling spatial dependence in a censored dependent variable framework:
"implementing this kind of double regime specification in a spatial lag context appears dif-
ficult" (Brueckner and Saavedra [9], p. 220). In fact, their analysis focused on the regime
switch represented by the introduction of a local tax limitation known as Proposition 2 1
2
and
found that the degree of spatial auto-correlation in local property taxes was somewhat lower
in the presence of the tax cap.
3 See Joumard and Kongsrud [23], Emmerson et al. [15], Sutherland et al. [41], Ambrosanio
and Bordignon [2], Zodrow [44]. Wolman et al. [43] provide a comprehensive and detailed
picture of local tax and expenditure limitations in the US states.
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function. In particular, we compare three diﬀerent estimators of the slope of an
intergovernmental fiscal reaction function in the frequently encountered case of
central government exercising its command by imposing an upper limit on local
fiscal choices: a) the conventional maximum likelihood estimator of a spatial lag
dependence specification that does not account for censoring; b) a spatial Tobit
estimator that allows for simultaneous spatial dependence; c) a discrete hazard
estimator of the probability of a local government hitting the upper censoring
point augmented with a dynamic spatial eﬀect.
The paper shows an application of the above empirical approaches to a panel
dataset of the (100) Italian provinces. In particular, the empirical analysis
focuses on the centrally imposed constraints on the main source of own revenue
for Italian provincial governments - the vehicle registration tax - and attempts
at identifying the factors that brought about the extraordinary race to the top
in the provincial vehicle tax during the 2000s.
Actually, while almost entirely neglected in the empirical public economics
literature,4 local vehicle taxation is widespreadly employed in both developed
and developing countries and it is of great interest from a public economics
standpoint for at least two reasons. If properly designed, it is one of the most
powerful instruments to reduce vehicle-related pollution, and can play a crucial
role in internalizing the external costs of road transport in terms of environmen-
tal and human health eﬀects.5 Second, due to the high visibility of vehicle taxes
and the widespread ownership of motor vehicles, vehicle taxation can work as
a signal of a government’s quality and competence, and could therefore foster
accountability and yardstick competition between decentralized governments.6
In fact, the evidence emerging from the investigation of the Italian Provinces’
tax setting behavior is generally consistent with the hypothesis of a process of
inter-provincial interaction. Moreover, the three estimation approaches outlined
above provide a coherent picture in terms of the direction and size of the spatial
auto-correlation process. In particular, the conventional spatial ML (maximum
likelihood) approach that does not account for centrally imposed censoring leads
to an estimate of the spatial auto-correlation coeﬃcient (0.08) that is remarkably
close to the estimate that is obtained with a Bayesian spatial Tobit approach
4Mahadi et al. [26], Suter and Walter [40] and Solé Ollé [39] represent exceptions. On
the other hand, the empirical literature on the related issue of gasoline taxation is far more
developed (Fredriksson and Millimet [19]).
5 Suter and Walter [40] oﬀer a detailed evaluation of the Swiss experience.
6 In addition, local vehicle taxation might give rise to tax competition as long as the tax
base (motor vehicles) is mobile across jurisdictions.
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that explicitly models both the clustering of authorities at the censoring point
and the process of simultaneous spatial dependence (0.10). Similarly, the dis-
crete hazard model provides evidence that the probability of an authority hitting
the upper censoring point is aﬀected by the (lagged) fiscal choices of neighboring
authorities. Due to the strategic timing of vehicle tax increases by Provincial
governments, with tax increases being generally implemented far from or right
after an election year, we are inclined to attribute the cause of the observed
spatial dependence in local fiscal choices to a political information spill-over,
by which Provinces that are forced to raise the vehicle tax to cope with their
growing spending needs make it less politically costly, and consequently more
likely, for other Provinces to raise their taxes too.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the three empirical
approaches for the estimation of a local policy reaction function in the presence
of centrally determined censoring. Section 3 turns to the application to the
Italian Provinces’ vehicle taxes and discusses a number of hypotheses for the
growth of the provincial vehicle tax over time. Section 4 reports and discusses
the estimation results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Centrally censored local fiscal policies
Following the enormous growth in tax and yardstick competition theoretical
research in the past two decades, the econometric analysis of spatial auto-
correlation in local governments’ fiscal policies has recently surged as one of
the most lively areas of research in applied public economics.7
Typically, the theory focuses on either of the following two constraints on
local policy-makers’ ability to raise revenues: the first is represented by the
mobility of the tax base giving rise to tax competition; the second consists in
the need for politicians to gain imperfectly informed taxpayers’ consensus in
the presence of cross-jurisdictional information spillovers making relative per-
formance evaluation preferable to absolute performance evaluation (yardstick
competition).
However, local governments around the world are hardly ever free to set
the fiscal policies they see fit. In fact, they are frequently subject to stringent
regulations and caps on their tax and spending decisions, making the ideal
paradigm of intergovernmental competition sort of blurred in practice.
7See the reviews in Brueckner [8] and Revelli [36].
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While the empirical tax competition and yardstick competition literatures
have virtually universally ignored those constraints, this paper attempts at ex-
ploring for the first time the consequences of central capping on the modelling
and estimation of a local fiscal policy reaction function.
In particular, the following two empirical issues should ideally be simul-
taneously tackled in empirical reserach. First, central command on local fiscal
policies generates censoring in the dependent variable. A frequently encountered
case is a cap (τ) on a local tax rate τ , meaning that τ ≤ τ , ideally calling for a
corner solution model accounting for clustering at the censoring point. Second,
in the presence of interdependence in local fiscal choices, the empirical model
needs to properly allow for the simultaneous determination of those choices,
with competing authorities exerting a reciprocal influence on each other.
2.1 The spatial lag dependence model
Let us consider first the conventional spatial lag specification of the tax reaction
function that takes the vector of observed local tax rates τ as the continuous de-
pendent variable. This model ignores altogether the censoring in the dependent
variable (τ ≤ τ), and can be expressed as:
τ it = ρτ−it + x
0
itβ + εit (1)
where τ it is the tax rate set by jurisdiction i in year t, and ρ (with −1 < ρ < 1
to ensure spatial stationarity) is the first-order spatial auto-regressive coeﬃcient
relating own tax rates to the spatially weighted average of other jurisdictions’
tax rates:
τ−it =
NX
j=1
wijτ jt (2)
where wij are spatial weights that, according to the conventional binary con-
tiguity criterion, equal 1ni if jurisdiction j is contiguous to jurisdiction i, and
equal 0 otherwise, with ni being the number of units being adjacent to unit i.
Finally, εit is assumed to be independently and identically distributed across
geographical units and over time.8
By further assuming that εit ∼ N(0, σ2ε), the spatial lag dependence model
(1)-(2) can conveniently be estimated by standard spatial econometric maxi-
8 In fact, residual spatial autocorrelation, i.e., the possibility of a spatial process in εit,
should be properly tested for before estimating the spatial lag specification (1). See section 4
below.
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mum likelihood (ML) techniques (Anselin [3]).9 In matrix form, the spatial lag
dependence model can be inverted and expressed as:
τ = (I − ρW )−1Xβ + (I − ρW )−1 ε (3)
where I is the (NT ×NT ) identity matrix and W = [IT ⊗WN ] is the block-
diagonal, row-standardized spatial weights matrix, with WN = {wij}, i, j =
1, ...,N , and
P
j wij = 1, ∇i.
However, disregarding censoring of the dependent variable leads to the fol-
lowing two problems. First, and similarly to the standard econometric problem
that is encountered when the dependent variable is censored (Winkelmann and
Boes [42]), not accounting for censoring leads to downward biased estimates
of the parameters β. Second, and more importantly for our purposes, it leads
to a potentially biased estimate of the crucial first-order spatial auto-regressive
coeﬃcient ρ measuring the slope of the reaction function.
In fact, assume that the ultimate objective of the empirical analysis consists
in recovering the “true” slope parameter ρ∗ in a reaction function where the
“desired” - and partly unobserved due to capping - tax rates are spatially auto-
correlated:
τ∗it = ρ
∗τ∗−it + x
0
itβ + εit (4)
τ∗−it =
NX
j=1
wijτ
∗
jt (5)
with the observed tax rate being generated as:
τ it =
(
τ
τ∗it
if
τ∗it ≥ τ
τ∗it < τ
(6)
In a way, model (1)-(2) is the observed counterpart of the latent model (4)-
(5). Since both the own tax (τ it) and the variable representing the average taxes
in neighboring jurisdictions (τ−it) are only observed after censoring, though, the
direction and size of the bias deriving from estimation of model (1)-(2) instead
of the true but unobserved process (4)-(5) are unkown a priori.
9Moreover, the spatial lag dependence specification can easily accommodate fixed time and
authority eﬀects.
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2.2 A Bayesian spatial Tobit approach
With −1 < ρ∗ < 1, the matrix form of equation (4) can be inverted and ex-
pressed as:
τ∗ = (I − ρ∗W )−1Xβ + (I − ρ∗W )−1 ε (7)
with variance-covariance matrix:
Ω = (I − ρ∗W )−1 (I − ρ∗W )−10 σ2ε (8)
The substantial diﬀerence of the latent variable model (7) with respect to
a non-spatial specification (ρ∗ = 0) is that the spatially correlated covariance
structure (8) does not allow the simplification of the multivariate distribution
into the product of univariate distributions. Moreover, the heteroskedasticity
implied by the spatial covariance structure causes inconsistency of standard
non-spatial discrete choice estimation methods (McMillen, [29]; Fleming [18]).
A number of approaches have recently been proposed to consistently estimate
variants of model (7), particularly with reference to a binary dependent variable
setting (spatial Probit), and where spatial dependence typically takes the form
of a first-order autoregressive process in the residuals (Pinkse and Slade [35]):
τ∗ = Xβ + v (9)
v = λWv + ε (10)
ε ∼ N(0, I) (11)
where λ, with −1 < λ < 1, is the auto-regressive coeﬃcient in the spatial error
process and W is as defined above.
The proposed estimation methods either focus on the heteroskedasticity in-
duced by the spatial model structure and address it by making specific assump-
tions on the form of the spatial weights matrix (Case [10]) and the variance-
covariance structure (Pinkse and Slade [35]), or make full use of the spatial in-
formation and rely on computationally complex techniques (the EM algorithm,
simulation methods or Bayesian methods) to tackle the issue of multidimen-
sional integration (Fleming [18]).
Within the latter class of models, the Bayesian spatial discrete choice method
developed by LeSage [24] overcomes some drawbacks that arise in the EM algo-
rithm when estimating standard errors (McMillen [29]), and has the advantage
of allowing the errors to be heteroskedastic after controlling for spatial depen-
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dence. Moreover, it tends to be superior to simulation methods (Beron and
Vijverberg [4]) in terms of computational requirements and flexibility (Flem-
ing [18]). Most importantly, though, the LeSage Bayesian approach is the best
suited to estimate a censored dependent variable - Tobit - model with simulta-
neous spatial dependence as in (7) above.
The Bayesian spatial Tobit approach is based on the principle that a like-
lihood function for model (7) can be formulated and optimized based on esti-
mates of the unobserved latent variable τ∗.10 In practice, the approach relies
on the actual observed τ values for uncensored observations, while estimates of
the unobserved latent variables τ∗ are obtained through Gibbs sampling from
a distribution of the latent variable (truncated at τ) conditional on all other
parameters in the model.11
The idea underlying the Bayesian spatial Tobit approach is similar to the
EM algorithm proposed by McMillen [29], where the censored or latent unob-
served observations on the dependent variable are replaced by estimated values.
Given estimates of the missing values, the EM algorithm proceeds to estimate
the other parameters in the model using methods applied to non-truncated data
samples. In other words, conditional on the estimated values, the estimation
problem is reduced to a non-censored estimation problem that can be solved
using maximum likelihood methods. Similarly, once a sample for the unob-
served latent dependent variables has been generated via the Gibbs sampler,
the Bayesian estimation of the censored model reduces to an heteroscedastic
spatial auto-regressive model. Moreover, the Bayesian spatial Tobit procedure
yields the mean and dispersion of all parameters, including the crucial spatial
lag coeﬃcient.
2.3 A discrete hazard approach
Finally, it could be argued that the specification (7) is not really capturing the
intergovernmental competition process that is likely to be at work, for two main
reasons.
First, in the presence of yardstick competition - or even more so if local juris-
10The LeSage [24] Bayesian spatial Tobit approach is extensively discussed in Fleming [18]
and LeSage and Kelley Pace [25]. The LeSage procedure has recently been applied to a local
public finance context by Fiva and Rattso [17].
11The Gibbs sampler is an algorithm to generate a sequence of samples from a joint prob-
ability distribution of two (or more) random variables. It can be shown that the sequence of
samples constitutes a Markov chain, and the stationary distribution of that Markov chain is
just the sought-after joint distribution (LeSage and Kelley Pace [25]).
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dictions were competing for a mobile tax base in a tax competition framework
- each jurisdiction cares about the actual policies enacted by its neighbors, not
their (unobserved) desired ones. As a result, the empirical specification would
require the ideal tax rate of each government to be aﬀected by neighboring
juridictions’ observed tax rates.
Second, the specification (7) relies on the assumption that, in every period, a
government elaborates its optimal tax rate as a function of its own characteristics
and neighbors’ fiscal choices. However, it is rarely the case in reality that a
government hitting the upper bound (the tax cap) ever reverts from there in
the future.12
As far as issue one above is concerned, a simultaneous dependence model
where desired policies τ∗ are allowed to depend on neighbors’ actual policies
(Wτ) is known to be algebraically inconsistent and cannot therefore be im-
plemented empirically (Beron and Vijverberg [4]). As a result, we follow here
the spatial discrete choice approach developed by Dubin [13] and implemented,
among the others, by Hautsch and Klotz [21], Paez and Scott [32] and Paez
et al. [32], and allow own attitudes towards taxation (τ∗t ) to be aﬀected by
neighbors’ lagged fiscal policies (Wτ t−1). In fact, the lagged specification can
be justified by the idea that the adjustment to neighboring authorities’ policies
does not take place instantly due to the sluggishness of the political process.
As for the second issue, we treat the occurrence of a government hitting the
upper bound as a discrete and irreversible event. In particular, we explicitly
account for the upper bound in the dependent variable that is generated by the
central cap, and model the event of local government i hitting the threshold
τ it = τ at some point t = 1, ..., T as a “failure.” Therefore, we estimate the
probability - or hazard - of “exit” from the inner interval (0, τ) in period t
conditional on having “survived” until then (Jenkins [22]; Winkelmann and
Boes [42]).
In particular, let Ti ∈ t = {1, 2, ..., T} denote the discrete survival time of
local government i, i.e, the number of years that elapse before the government
sets the maximum tax rate. The authorities surviving until the end of the period
with τ it < τ have a censored duration of Ti = T . The hazard function of Ti
is the probability that Ti = t, conditional on government i not having failed in
previous periods and on a number of time-varying characteristics - the vector xit
discussed with reference to the reaction function (1) - plus a set of time dummies
12See section 4 below for evidence in this respect.
9
(zt) capturing duration dependence. By choosing a normal distribution for the
formulation of the probability of exit, we can estimate a Probit model where the
dependent variable takes value 0 in the years preceding the occurrence of the
event τ i = τ . Censored observations - that is governments for which the event
never occurs in the period considered here - take value 0 in all years. When the
event occurs (yit = 1), the local government exits the sample:
yit =
(
1
0
if
τ∗it ≥ τ
τ∗it < τ
(12)
In order to ascertain whether neighboring governments’ fiscal choices aﬀect
the probability that a government hits the upper bound, we include the one-
year lag of the spatially weighted average of neighbors’ tax rates (with coeﬃcient
ρ−1) among the explanatory variables, obtaining the following formulation for
the desired tax rate:
τ∗it = x
0
itγ + ρ−1
NX
j=1
wijτ jt−1 + zt + ηit (13)
The specification of the desired tax rate in equation (13) implies that the
lagged choices of neighboring jurisdictions can be treated as exogenous, and the
hazard model can consequently be estimated by standard Probit.
3 The provincial vehicle tax in Italy
The Italian system of local government is organized as a three-tier structure,
with over 8,000 municipalities, 100 Provinces and 20 Regions.13 While Regions
are in charge of health care services, Municipalities and Provinces share respon-
sibility in the provision of local public services in the environmental, transporta-
tion, education and personal social service areas. Provinces play an important
role in planning and coordinating municipal policies, particularly as far as the
decisions that transcend strictly municipal boundaries - such as the control of
industrial, car and heating pollution, as well as the management and disposal
13There also exist three “autonomous” Provinces in the upper North mountaneous bilingual
regions, with special features and competencies. Due to their peculiarities, they are not
considered in the rest of the analysis. In addition, seven new Provinces were recently created
by redrawing the boundaries of the existing ones, thus bringing the number of Provinces to
107. However, we disregard them by focusing on the 2000-2006 time span, when the relevant
data are available and consistent.
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of waste - are concerned. Moreover, Provinces have exclusive responsibility for
the construction and maintenance of intermunicipal roads, local transportation
systems and secondary education schools and buildings.
Provincial expenditures rose considerably in recent years due to the devo-
lution of (mostly) administrative duties from the regional and national govern-
ments. In fact, average per capita spending increased by about 40% in real
terms between 2000 and 2006 - the time period on which the empirical analysis
of this paper focusses.
Provincial authorities fund their expenditures through three main sources
of revenues: 1) grants from upper levels of government; 2) revenue sharing
arrangements; 3) own tax revenues.
First, grants to Provinces cover more than half of total current spending,
with the proportion of grant-funded local spending slightly increasing over the
2000-2006 period. Grants from the central and regional governments are pre-
dominant and correspond to about 16 and
1
3 of local provincial spending respec-
tively, the remaining grants being represented by specific transfers from other
public bodies and international organizations.
Second, about 14 of spending is funded via sharing of central government rev-
enues, namely the personal income tax revenues based on taxpayers’ province of
residence (1% of it accruing to Provinces), and the motor-vehicle insurance tax,
that - given the province-based territorial structure of the vehicle registration
archive and bureaucracy - is entirely devolved to provincial authorities based on
the province where the vehicle is registered.
Finally, slightly less than 14 of provincial current spending is funded by own
tax revenues, that are mainly constituted by the provincial vehicle registration
tax (over 60% of own revenues), with the other own sources of revenues granting
provincial governments either an extremely limited degree of fiscal autonomy or
an almost negligible size of actual revenues.14 As a result, the actual degree
of fiscal autonomy of the Provinces basically rests on their ability to vary the
vehicle registration tax rate.
The provincial vehicle registration tax was introduced in the year 2000 in
order to attribute the provincial level of government an own source of revenues
so as to reduce the reliance on external funding, and to foster the accountability
of provincial administrations to their electorates. All brand new vehicles - as
14The other own sources of revenue include a surcharge on the national tax on the con-
sumption of electricity, a surcharge on the municipal refuse collection charge, and a number
of other minor sources of revenue.
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well as used vehicles in case of change of ownership - are liable to the payment
of the provincial vehicle registration tax the first time they are registered in the
provincial archive under a given owner’s name. The total tax due is made of a
lump-sum amount plus a variable component that is related to the size, power
and destination of the vehicle.
Central government establishes a lower and an upper bound on the vehicle
tax parameters that Provinces can set, with the upper bound corresponding
to a 20% higher tax burden than the one corresponding to the lower bound.
Consequently, not having the power to alter the centrally set structure of the tax,
the decision of each Province basically consists in determining autonomously the
percentage tax spread (τ from here onwards, with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 20) relative to the
lower bound (τ) set by central government.
Table 1 The provincial vehicle registration tax: key statistics
Average τ τ t=τ τ t=τ τ t=τ |τ t−1 < τ
2000 11.9 31 56 56
2001 14.5 19 68 12
2002 16.5 9 79 11
2003 16.7 8 80 1
2004 16.9 8 81 1
2005 17.6 6 86 5
2006 18 4 88 2
2000-2006 16.5
Notes: 100 Provinces; τ is the provincial vehicle registration tax rate spread. τ and
τ are the lower (0%) and upper (20%) bounds set by central government respectively.
Table 1 reports the average τ along with the number of Provinces setting
the minimum (τ = τ = 0) and maximum (τ = τ = 20) tax spreads in each of
the seven years following the introduction of the provincial vehicle tax (2000-
2006). The table shows that Provinces steadily raised their tax spreads over
time, with almost 90% of them hitting the upper bound by the year 2006.15 A
similar picture emerges from figure 1 in the Appendix, where the evolution of
the geographical pattern of the provincial vehicle tax during the period under
examination is depicted.
15Starting from 2007, the cap has been raised to 30%.
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3.1 A race to the top in vehicle taxation? The null hy-
pothesis
Before turning to the discussion and test of the hypothesis of “yardstick compe-
tition” as the driving force of the race to the top in provincial vehicle taxation, it
is fair to briefly review some alternative interpretations of the observed phenom-
enon. In fact, the widespread growth of provincial vehicle tax rates might be
exhaustively explained by the evolution of the underlying common determinants
of provincial fiscal decisions (e.g., changes in the socio-economic environment,
growth of spending needs, or decrease in external funding), even in the absence
of inter-jurisdictional spill-overs. In correlated environments, local decision-
makers acting in isolation might give the false impression of interacting with
each other - the so-called “reflection problem” (Manski [27]).
There exist three plausible explanations of the observed evolution of the
provincial tax pattern that are compatible with the the null hypothesis of ab-
sence of inter-provincial competition.
The first one has to do with the features of the central constraints imposed
onto local decisions. Actually, the lower tax bound set by central government
in the year 2000 remained fixed in nominal terms for all subsequent years.16
As a result, provincial governments were in a way forced to raise their tax rate
spreads in order to preserve vehicle tax revenues in real terms, inevitably ending
up hitting the upper bound τ at some point.
Second, the widespread increase in the provincial tax might have been fos-
tered by the increase in public spending responsibilities of provincial govern-
ments as a result of the process of devolution of administrative functions by
upper levels of government (Regions and State) during the 2000s. In fact, the
late 1990s’ reforms implied that the devolution of central and regional respon-
sibilities to local governments had to be accompanied by an adequate transfer
of resources (grants) to cope with the novel spending requirements, based on
estimates of the additional costs for local governments. However, if central
and regional grants systematically underestimated the new spending needs of
provincial administrations, the latter would be subject to a mounting pressure
to raise own sources of revenue. From 2000 to 2006, total financial resources
transferred by the national and regional governments to the Provinces increased
16The lump-sum component of the vehicle registration tax was set in 2000 at euro 150 for
cars and up to euro 650 for heavy trucks, while the variable component depended on the
engine power and use of vehicles, and ranged from 1.75 euro to 3.50 euro per engine kW.
Those tariﬀs remained unchanged over the subsequent decade.
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by about 50% in real terms. While it is hard to say whether such a growth was
commensurate to the enlargement in provincial functions and responsibilities,
the financial inadequacy argument was frequently and forcefully put forward by
provincial and municipal governments during the devolution process.
While the two arguments above rely on exogenous influences on provin-
cial decisions, there might exist a third, endogenous cause of the increase in
the provincial tax that shares the feature of requiring no competition among
Provinces. In fact, during the years 2000s the Italian population rose from less
than 57 to over 59 million and the total stock of vehicles expanded from less
than 40 to over 46 million. Such a considerable change in the socio-economic
environment might well have been responsible for an increase in the demand
for public services, thereby pushing provincial governments to raise their own
revenues and necessarily hit the upper bound τ at some point, depending on
the pace of growth of the provincial economy.
According to all of the above arguments, Provinces would simply face simi-
larly evolving circumstances and would consequently react in similar ways, that
is by manoeuvring their only autonomous means of raising revenues. In or-
der to check whether those arguments can exhaustively explain the growth of
provincial tax rates, we first speculate on the consequences of vehicle taxation
in terms of government popularity. Afterwards, we will turn to the estimation
of the provincial tax spread determination process.
3.2 Vehicle taxation and government popularity
One longstanding contribution of the “public choice” view of government re-
cently revitalized by the so-called “political economy” literature (Persson and
Tabellini [34], Besley [5]) was to demean the secular revenue-raising function
of taxes and to stress instead their role as signals of politicians’ quality and
competence. In conventional political agency models, high tax levels are gener-
ally perceived by voters-principals as symptoms of ineﬃcient use of resources,
waste, transfers to special interests, or corruption. Consequently, if politicians
know that voters have a tendency towards “fiscal conservatism,” they might use
their tax instruments strategically in order to minimize their loss of popularity
(Peltzman [31]).
In particular, two circumstances are likely to aﬀect the degree to which a
tax increase translates into a loss of consensus and pluralities.
First, the popularity loss following a tax increase is arguably higher the
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closer is the tax rise to the next election. In fact, even without having to rely
on sort of out-of-fashion assumptions on voters’ memory, the media are likely
to devote more attention to a government’s fiscal policies in the proximity of an
election.17
Second, the adverse popularity consequences of a tax rise are likely to be
less severe if other governments in correlated economic environments are raising
their taxes too. According to the “yardstick competition” hypothesis (Besley
and Case [6]), a voting strategy based on relative fiscal performance evaluation
is optimal in the presence of asymmetric information between taxpayers and
policymakers and with multiple agents facing correlated fiscal shocks.
In the light of the above arguments, one could wonder whether the evolution
of the provincial vehicle tax was influenced at all by electoral considerations.
Provincial elections in Italy occur every five years, with direct popular election
of the president of the Province, typically out of four to five candidates, and the
members of the provincial Council. Councillors are elected by a proportional
electoral system with a majority premium ensuring that the elected President
is backed by at least 60% of the Council members. The elected President is
the head of the provincial government, directly nominates the members of the
government, and sets the provincial policy strategy and targets.
Table 2 summarizes the provincial election schedule in the 2000-2006 period.
3
4 of the 100 Provinces held an election around the middle of the period (2003-
2004), while some Provinces had an election in the early 2000s and went again
to the polls five years later. Overall, we have 119 election occurrences over seven
years.
Over the same period, table 2 also shows that the provincial vehicle tax
spread was raised by provincial governments 113 times. Interestingly, though,
the last column in table 2 shows that in only four of the 113 instances the tax
rise occurred in a year when a provincial election was scheduled to take place,
with the remaining 109 tax rises being decided in “safer” non-election years.
Furthermore, while the chances of success (re-election) of the incumbent in
the overall sample exceed 75%, only 50% of the incumbents that raised the tax
in election years managed to be re-elected.18
The above stylized facts provide a piece of suggestive evidence of oppor-
17See the evidence and references in Revelli [37].
18This evidence must of course be taken with caution due to the very few occurrences of tax
rises in election years. In fact, the small number of observations precludes us from explicitly
estimating a re-election function, and forces us to be content with these suggestive descriptive
statistics.
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tunistic setting of vehicle taxes. It seems that electoral considerations play a
role, with provincial governments timing tax increases in order to minimize their
adverse consequences in terms of popularity.
Table 2 Vehicle tax policy and provincial elections
el = 1 ∆τ > 0 ∆τ > 0|el = 1
2000 6 69 2
2001 9 14 0
2002 10 15 1
2003 12 2 1
2004 63 3 0
2005 6 7 0
2006 13 3 0
2000-2006 119 113 4
% re-elected 76.5 50
Notes: 100 Provinces; el = 1 in year t if a provincial election is held in that year.
∆τ = τ(t)− τ(t− 1) is the change in the provincial vehicle registration tax rate
spread τ from year t− 1 to year t.
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4 The provincial vehicle tax setting process
The prima facie evidence from figure 1 along with the political economy sugges-
tions in section 3.2 call for an empirical model that explicitly allows provincial
tax setting polices to be interdependent. As long as electoral considerations
play a role in local tax setting, the empirical model should allow the vehicle tax
determination process in a Province to be aﬀected both by “internal” determi-
nants and by “external” determinants capturing the wider political environment
in which local decisions are made.
According to the yardstick competition hypothesis, a particularly important
role in this respect is likely to be played by the vehicle tax policies imple-
mented by the Provinces that face a similar macroeconomic environment and
are therefore most likely to face correlated shocks. The level of the provincial
tax spread might convey a signal of the “quality” of policymakers, thereby gen-
erating a process of yardstick competition between consensus-seeking provincial
governments. If information on a Province’s vehicle tax policy spills over into
neighboring Provinces, vehicle tax increases in nearby Provinces make it less
costly in terms of popularity, and consequently more likely, for a Province to
raise its tax too.
We start from the spatial lag specification (1) of section 2.1. The vector of
time-varying explanatory variables xit includes grants per capita, income (value
added) per capita, the stock of vehicles registered in the province in the previous
year, a dummy that equals 1 in election years, a dummy that equals 1 if the
government is right-wing, and the weighted average of neighboring provinces’
tax spreads defined in equation (2).19
Since τ it and τ−it are determined simultaneously, equation (1) is estimated
by spatial maximum likelihood techniques (Anselin [3]). Based on the fact
that the (700 × 1) vector of average neighboring provinces’ tax spreads τ−
equals [I ⊗W ] τ , where I is the (7 × 7) identity matrix and W = {wij} is
the (100× 100) exogenous spatial weights matrix, the matrix form of equation
(1) can be inverted as in (3) and estimated by maximum likelihood techniques.20
The results of estimation of a parsimonious specification of the spatial lag de-
pendence specification (3) that includes no control variables (β = 0) are reported
in table 3, while table 4 reports the results with all of the above explanatory
19The size of population residing in the province cannot be included because it is almost
perfectly linearly correlated with the stock of vehicles (correlation coeﬃcient > 0.99).
20The likelihood function is maximized via the MAXLIK procedure in GAUSS.
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variables included. Both specifications include fixed Province (qi) and time (zt)
eﬀects.
In tables 3 and 4, the first column reports the results of OLS estimation of a
non-spatial specification (ρ = 0); the second column reports the OLS estimates
of the spatial lag specification; the third column shows the ML results of the
spatial lag specification, under the hypothesis that εit is normally distributed;
finally, the fourth column contains the ML estimation results of a spatial error
dependence model (Anselin [3]), where ρ = 0 and nearby Provinces are allowed
to be hit by spatially auto-correlated shocks:
τ it = x0itβ + qi + zt + vit (14)
vit = λv−it + εit (15)
where, similarly to equation (2), v−it is defined as:
v−it =
100X
j=1
wijvjt (16)
The tests for spatial auto-correlation in column (a) of table 3 and column
(e) of table 4 point rather consistently towards positive spatial auto-correlation
in the residuals of a non-spatial specification.21 In the fully specified equation,
the LM (Lagrange Multiplier) tests tend to favour the spatial lag dependence
model over the spatial error dependence one: the LM test cannot reject the null
of no spatial auto-correlation in the errors, while the corresponding LM test
against a spatial lag of τ points to positive spatial auto-correlation in provincial
tax spreads.22
21The Moran test is asymptotycally distributed as a standard normal under the null hy-
pothesis of absence of spatial auto-correlation, while the LM tests against the hypotheses of
a spatial lag - model (1) - or a spatial error - model (14)-(15) - are both distributed as χ2(1)
(Anselin [3]). All tests are performed in GAUSS.
22Clearly, the two LM tests take on the same value in table 3, where no exogenous variables
are included, since the spatial lag and spatial error models are indistinguishable in that case,
as shown by the ML estimation results in columns (c) and (d).
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Table 3 Vehicle tax spread determination: baseline linear specification
(a) (b) (c) (d)
ML OLS ML ML
constant
-4.224***
(0.373)
-3.281***
(0.464)
-3.658***
(0.429)
-4.161***
(0.422)
year 2001
2.580***
(0.528)
1.985***
(0.553)
2.222***
(0.540)
2.528***
(0.596)
year 2002
4.740***
(0.528)
3.674***
(0.611)
4.099***
(0.578)
4.664***
(0.596)
year 2003
4.970***
(0.528)
3.870***
(0.616)
4.309***
(0.581)
4.902***
(0.597)
year 2004
5.100***
(0.528)
3.970***
(0.621)
4.421***
(0.584)
5.030***
(0.596)
year 2005
5.890***
(0.528)
4.585***
(0.651)
5.107***
(0.604)
5.809***
(0.597)
year 2006
6.290***
(0.528)
4.880***
(0.671)
5.444***
(0.615)
6.192***
(0.597)
ρ
0.201***
(0.060)
0.121***
(0.047)
λ
0.121***
(0.047)
Fixed Province eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -1914.49 -1911.21 -1911.21
Observations 700 700 700 700
Moran test
(p value)
3.358
(0.001)
LM lag test
(p value)
8.628
(0.003)
LM error test
(p value)
8.628
(0.003)
LR test
(p value)
6.552
(0.010)
6.552
(0.010)
Notes: dep. var. = provincial tax spread (0 ≤ τ ≤ 20); standard errors in paren-
theses; *, **, *** (p-value < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01).
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Table 4 Vehicle tax spread determination: full linear specification
(e) (f) (g) (h)
ML OLS ML ML
constant
-5.053***
(0.505)
-4.296***
(0.612)
-4.606***
(0.567)
-4.965***
(0.531)
election dummyit
-0.641
(0.443)
-0.580
(0.436)
-0.605
(0.428)
-0.632
(0.447)
grantsit
-2.966***
(0.729)
-2.630***
(0.743)
-2.769***
(0.733)
-2.790***
(0.757)
incomeit−1
-0.446*
(0.244)
-0.417*
(0.245)
-0.429*
(0.247)
-0.435*
(0.245)
stock of vehiclesit−1
1.774**
(0.718)
1.728**
(0.714)
1.747**
(0.717)
1.751**
(0.716)
right-wing dummyit−1
-0.575
(0.866)
-0.481
(0.826)
-0.519
(0.825)
-0.502
(0.830)
ρ
0.135**
(0.061)
0.080*
(0.047)
λ
0.062
(0.048)
Fixed Province eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -1898.87 -1897.45 -1898.08
Observations 700 700 700 700
Moran test
(p value)
1.882
(0.060)
LM lag test
(p value)
3.690
(0.055)
LM error test
(p value)
2.019
(0.155)
LR test
(p value)
2.840
(0.091)
1.570
(0.210)
Notes: dep. var. = provincial tax spread (0 ≤ τ ≤ 20); standard errors in paren-
theses; *, **, *** (p-value < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01); time eﬀects included.
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The parsimonious specification in table 3 yields an OLS estimate of the spa-
tial auto-correlation coeﬃcient ρ of about 0.20, and an ML estimate of 0.12.
After controlling for a number of exogenous local characteristics (table 4), evi-
dence of a significant spatial dependence process in τ persists. While the (up-
ward biased) OLS estimate of ρ in column (f) is 0.135, the ML estimate of ρ in
column (g) of table 4 is an admittedly not overwhelming value of 0.08, pointing
towards a pretty flat reaction function. However, as argued above, this is what
one could expect given the censoring in the dependent variable, and bρML might
be suﬀering from a downward bias.
On the other hand, λ - the auto-regressive coeﬃcient of the error dependence
process (15) - is not estimated to be significantly diﬀerent from zero in column
(h). The LR (Likelihood Ratio) test results reported at the bottom of columns
(g) and (h) sort of redundantly summarize the above findings in terms of the
overall performances of the spatial lag and spatial error models relative to a
non-spatial specification.
As far as the other variables are concerned, right-wing ideology, proximity
to elections, per capita income and grants from upper levels of government all
tend to be associated with lower tax spreads.23 Finally, the stock of vehicles
circulating in the province has a positive eﬀect on the provincial tax rate, pos-
sibly reflecting increasing marginal costs of providing transport-related public
services due to congestion.
Table 5, columns (i) and (j), reports the estimation results of the Bayesian
spatial Tobit model.24 The estimate of the spatial auto-correlation coeﬃcient is
0.15 and it is highly significant in the basic specification with β = 0, while it is
around 0.10 when the eﬀect of the explanatory variables on the provincial tax
rate is accounted for. Overall, the Bayesian spatial Tobit results provide a very
similar picture of the spatial pattern as the spatial lag specification that ignores
censoring, and suggest that the latter is only weakly aﬀected by a donward
bias. Moreover, the coeﬃcient estimates on the other explanatory variables are
similar in the two models.
Finally, table 5 also reports the Probit estimates of the discrete hazard model
discussed in section 2.3. Estimation is performed on an unbalanced panel data
set of 150 observations for the years 2001 to 2006, and exploits two interesting
23The negative eﬀect of income is probably due to the fact that wealthier provinces are able
to raise revenues from other tax sources, without having to increase the vehicle tax rate.
24Estimation is performed in Matlab based on the routines for a spatial auto-regressive
Tobit model (sart_g function) provided by James LeSage (www.spatial-econometrics.com).
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features of the data. The first consists - as shown in table 1 - in the fast growth
in the provincial tax spreads that led 88/100 Provinces to hit the centrally set
upper bound by 2006. Second, the decision to set the maximum tax spread
seems to be an irreversible one. None of the Provinces that happened to end
up in the upper corner solution τ = τ ever moved away from there. In terms
of table 1, the 56 Provinces that set τ = τ in 2000 were stuck there for the
rest of the period, with a varying number of further Provinces (from 1 to 12)
joining them in each of the subsequent years. Since the 2000 cross-section is
lost in taking the lag of neighboring Provinces’ tax rates, and due to the fact
that Provinces leave the sample when hitting the upper bound, we are left with
150 observations, 32 of which are censored. The resulting data structure for
estimation of the discrete hazard model is depicted in figure 2 in the Appendix.
Column (k) in table 5 reports in particular the partial probability eﬀects
computed at the sample means. Partial eﬀects for dummy variables are com-
puted as the change in probability when a dummy variable shifts from 0 to 1, so
that, for instance, the probability that a right-wing government hits the upper
threshold is ten percentage points lower than it is for a left-wing government.
The coeﬃcient on the election year dummy has a similar size, but it is not sta-
tistically significant. As far as the eﬀect of lagged neighboring Provinces’ tax
policies is concerned, it is estimated that an increase by 2 percentage points
in the average tax rate τ of neighboring Provinces raises the probability of a
Province hitting the upper bound τ in the subsequent year by around 3 per-
centage points.
Overall, the evidence is generally consistent with the hypothesis of a process
of inter-provincial interaction in the setting of vehicle taxes. In particular,
the interaction process exhibits a geographical pattern, with the size of the
spatial auto-correlation coeﬃcient lying most likely in the vicinity of 0.10. In
particular, the standard maximum likelihood estimate of ρ from a spatial lag
dependence model that ignores censoring turns out to be remarkably close (0.08)
to the estimate obtained in a bayesian spatial Tobit model that explicitly takes
censoring into account (0.10). Interestingly, a similar picture emerges when
estimating a discrete hazard specification that models the probability of a local
government hitting the centrally set upper bound as a function of the tax rates
chosen by adjacent governments in the previous period.
22
Table 5 Vehicle tax spread determination: alternative specifications
(i) (j) (k)
spatial Tobit spatial Tobit hazard Probit
election dummyit
-0.609
(0.810)
-0.100
(0.078)
grantsit
-1.245**
(0.643)
-0.001
(0.001)
incomeit−1
0.231***
(0.056)
-0.017***
(0.006)
stock of vehiclesit−1
-0.645***
(0.064)
-0.030
(0.051)
right-wing dummyit−1
-2.589***
(0.599)
-0.109*
(0.070)
ρ∗
0.153***
(0.051)
0.098**
(0.050)
ρ−1
0.015**
(0.007)
year 2001
12.132***
(1.023)
12.985***
(1.510)
year 2002
14.231***
(1.134)
15.526***
(1.609)
0.371**
(0.197)
year 2003
14.443***
(1.108)
15.860***
(1.625)
0.438**
(0.206)
year 2004
14.575***
(1.171)
16.169***
(1.669)
0.006
(0.178)
year 2005
15.242***
(1.203)
16.458***
(1.596)
0.338*
(0.234)
year 2006
15.626***
(1.199)
16.774***
(1.585)
0.173
(0.237)
Observations 700 700 150
Right-censored
(τ it=τ)
538 538 32
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** (p-value < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01).
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5 Concluding remarks
The empirical tax and yardstick competition literature that has grown impres-
sively in the past two decades relies on the implicit and universal assumption
that decentralised governments are free to set their tax policy instruments. How-
ever, local governments around the globe are hardly ever able to set the policies
they see fit. In most instances, local governments’ observed fiscal policies are
censored due to existence of central government mandates or caps either on
taxes or on public expenditures.
This paper has explored for the first time the consequences of central cap-
ping on the modelling and estimation of a local fiscal policy reaction function.
By means of an empirical application on provincial vehicle taxation in Italy,
we have employed three empirical approaches to the estimation of the inter-
jurisdictional spatial interaction coeﬃcient in the frequently encountered case
of central government exercising its command by imposing upper limits on local
fiscal choices.
It turns out that the three approaches provide a similar suggestion as to the
direction and size of the interaction, and the conventional spatial lag dependence
model that ignores censoring provides an estimate of the spatial autoregressive
coeﬃcient (0.08) that is reassuringly close to the Bayesian spatial Tobit esti-
mate (0.10). Interestingly, a similar picture emerges when estimating a discrete
hazard specification that models the probability of a local government hitting
the centrally set upper bound as a function of the tax rates chosen by adja-
cent governments in the previous year. According to the lagged hazard model,
an increase by two percentage points in the average tax rate τ of neighboring
Provinces raises the probability of a Province hitting the upper bound τ in the
subsequent year by around three percentage points. Due to the strategic timing
of vehicle tax increases by Provincial governments, we are inclined to attribute
the cause of the observed spatial dependence to a political information spill-over,
by which Provinces that “fail” - i.e., are forced to set the maximum vehicle tax
rate to cope with their rising spending needs - make it less politically costly,
and consequently more likely, for other Provinces to fail too.
While the empirical exercise performed in this paper might therefore tend
to suggest that explicitly allowing for local tax censoring yields an admittedly
small gain (and requires a high computational cost) relative to more standard
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estimation approaches, it should be taken into account that the direction and
size of the bias caused by ignoring the censored nature of a local fiscal policy in a
spatial lag dependence model are unknown a priori. In fact, since they plausibly
depend on the intensity of the spatial interaction process, on the sample distri-
bution of the latent variable, and on the structure of the spatial weights matrix,
it seems that further theoretical and empirical research in this area is necessary
in order to evaluate the relative merits of alternative estimation approaches in
the presence of spatially dependent censored fiscal policies.
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Appendix
Table A1 Variables used in the analysis: descriptive statistics
obs. mean s.d. min max
Spatial lag dependence and Tobit models
Vehicle tax spread (%) 700 16.5 6.9 0 20
Stock of vehicles (,000) 700 426.9 486.1 57.1 3514.2
Newly registered vehicles (,000) 700 31.4 50.5 3.1 471.2
Income (value added per capita; ,000 €) 700 20.1 5.0 10.8 34.3
Current spending per capita (€) 700 155.4 50.8 55.6 327.3
Grants per capita (€) 700 93.8 49.0 3.5 243.2
Right-wing control (%) 700 36
Discrete hazard model
Vehicle tax spread (%) 150 8.9 8.0 0 20
Stock of vehicles (,000) 150 704.5 822.0 59.5 3383.1
Newly registered vehicles (,000) 150 56.6 86.5 3.2 414.6
Income (value added per capita; ,000 €) 150 19.7 6.1 10.9 34.3
Current spending per capita (€) 150 136.0 40.8 69.7 251.3
Grants per capita (€) 150 79.9 44.8 11.9 196.7
Right-wing control (%) 150 55
Table A2 Variables used in the analysis: data sources
source years
Vehicle tax Automobile Club Italy - Quattroruote 2000-2006
Stock of vehicles Public Registry of Vehicles 1999-2006
Vehicle registrations Public Registry of Vehicles 1999-2006
Income National Statistics Institute 1999-2005
Current spending Italian Government, Home Oﬃce 2000-2006
Grants Italian Government, Home Oﬃce 2000-2006
Right-wing control Italian Government, Home Oﬃce 1999-2006
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Figure 1: Vehicle tax spatial pattern
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Figure 2: Data structure for discrete hazard model
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